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Abstract
In this study we examine the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) by firms
that have private placements of equity before their IPOs (PP IPO firms). We find that
PP IPOs are associated with significantly less underpricing than their peers. Furthermore,
PP IPOs are associated with lower underwriting spreads, more reputable underwriting
syndicates, and greater postissue analyst coverage as compared to IPOs that are issued
by their industry peers under similar market conditions. Consistent with the implications
of the information asymmetry explanation for IPO underpricing, our findings suggest
that companies could benefit by conveying their quality via successful pre-IPO private
placements that help reduce the cost of going public.
JEL Classification: G24, G32
I. Introduction
Recent studies examine initial public offering (IPO) underpricing of firms that have a
prior history of external funding activities and document findings consistent with the
information asymmetry explanation. Cai, Ramchand, and Warga (2004) examine under-
pricing of firms that have public debt offerings before their IPOs and find significantly
less underpricing for these issuers. The public awareness and monitoring of these issuing
firms resulting from their pre-IPO public debt offerings reduces the degree of informa-
tion asymmetry on their quality, which leads to less underpricing of their IPOs. James
(1987) and Stein (2002) show that bank loans may have positive effects on the valuation
of borrowing firms. By granting a loan, banks implicitly disclose part of their propri-
etary information about the borrowers and certify the financial conditions of borrowing
firms. Furthermore, Schenone (2004) shows that issuing firms with pre-IPO banking
relationships face less IPO underpricing, suggesting that the certifying capacity of banks
ameliorates the degree of information asymmetry about the quality of issuing firms.
As another form of external funding activities, pre-IPO private placements of
equity may reduce IPO underpricing of issuing firms. First, private placements allow
privately held firms to introduce themselves to the investment community before their
IPOs. Information about the completed private placement is usually available to general
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investors via media coverage such as announcements in the Wall Street Journal and
other investment publications such as Private Placement Letters. The availability of such
information facilitates the public awareness of the issuing firm before its IPO and hence
reduces the degree of information asymmetry on the issuer’s quality and value. To the
extent that a greater degree of information asymmetry leads to a higher level of IPO
underpricing, issuing firms that have pre-IPO private placements would experience less
underpricing at the time of their IPOs. However, we acknowledge the potential selection
bias in our sample if only successful private placement issuers would go public. If such
bias were present in the sample, the underpricing of PP IPOs could not be interpreted
exclusively on the causality between IPO underpricing and the resolution of information
asymmetry. But information asymmetry could still be a viable explanation for PP IPO
underpricing because investors would interpret a successful pre-IPO private placement
as a valuable signal about the PP IPO firm in their pricing decisions.
Second, the certifying role played by pre-IPO private placement investors could
signal the quality of the firm. Similar to banking relationships, private placements provide
an effective channel for issuing firms to convey valuable information concerning their
quality to target institutional investors and high-net-worth, knowledgeable individual
investors. The participation of informed private placement investors could be considered
as a certification of the quality of the issuing firm that may lead to less underpricing of
its IPO.
Third, the monitoring role played by active institutional investors participating in
the pre-IPO private placements could improve efficient use of corporate resources that
further enhances the quality of issuing firms (Wruck 1989). This may further reduce the
underpricing of IPOs of firms that have successful private placements of equity before
going public.
In this study, we examine IPO underpricing of a sample of 500 PP IPO firms
(firms that had at least a successful pre-IPO private placement of equity) relative to that of
their peers, which did not have private placements before their IPOs during 1981–2002.
We find that PP IPOs experience significantly less underpricing than their peers, even
after we control for factors that are known to affect IPO underpricing.
In further analysis, we find some support for the role of asymmetric information
in explaining the lesser underpricing of PP IPOs. Using the availability of pre-IPO data
on the Compustat database as a proxy for the information environment faced by issuing
firms before their IPOs, we find that pre-IPO data are available for a larger portion
of the PP IPOs sample than for the matched sample. In addition, we find that there
is a significantly larger portion of PP IPOs that are covered by analysts than that for
the matched sample. These results are consistent with the notion that pre-IPO private
placements help mitigate the level of information asymmetry of issuing firms.
Our findings, however, provide much weaker support for the certification ex-
planation. The PP IPOs placed with informed investors show less underpricing relative
to those placed with uninformed investors. However, the difference is not significant.
Besides, we find that PP IPO issuers experience significantly less underpricing than
their matched IPO peers, regardless of whether their private placements are placed with
informed or uninformed investors. There is limited support for the monitoring role of pre-
IPO private placement investors in reducing IPO underpricing. Our results indicate that
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IPO issuers with their pre-IPO equity privately placed with active monitoring investors
experience significantly less underpricing than their matched IPO peers. On the other
hand, underpricing of PP IPOs with their pre-IPO equity placed with passive investors
is comparable with that of their peers. However, PP IPOs placed with active monitoring
investors do not show significant less underpricing relative to those placed with passive
investors.
In addition, we examine the long-term stock return performance PP IPOs relative
to their peers using the Fama (1993) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) calendar-time
portfolio approach. We find that PP IPOs, similar to their peers, do not show risk-adjusted
abnormal stock returns over an extended three-year horizon.
Consistent with recent findings on IPO underpricing of issuing firms that have
prior external funding activities (Cai, Ramchand, and Warga 2004; Schenone 2004), our
results indicate that successful pre-IPO private placements of equity lower issuance costs,
both indirect (underpricing) and direct (underwriting spread), for PP IPO firms. Although
it is plausible that our findings may reflect successful pre-IPO private placement issuers
going public, they are consistent with the general notion that pre-IPO private placements
may mitigate the level of information asymmetry on the quality of issuing firms. There is
also some weak support for the notion that IPO issuers may benefit from the certification
of informed investors and the active monitoring role of their private placement investors.
Overall, our results suggest that companies could benefit by conveying their quality via
successful pre-IPO private placements that may help reduce the cost of going public.
II. Literature Review on IPO Underpricing and Private Placement
Information Asymmetry Explanation
A common explanation for the underpricing of equity IPOs is that it reflects the degree
of information asymmetry concerning the true value of issuing firms when they go
public (Rock 1986; Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm 1996). Regardless of the sources
of information asymmetry and the roles of different participants in the IPO process,
theoretical models postulate that less underpricing is associated with IPOs that are subject
to a lesser degree of information asymmetry.
Hertzel and Smith (1993) show that private placements can mitigate the level of
information asymmetry concerning firm quality and value. Recent studies that examine
the choice of issuance methods show that quality firms experiencing a greater degree of
information asymmetry tend to use private placements over public offerings in raising
external capital to reduce the costs of adverse selection and information production
(Maksimovic and Pichler 2006). Sharpe and Woo (2005) find that the likelihood of using
private placements increases with the degree of information asymmetry and the reputation
of privately held firms.
These studies suggest that private placement is chosen as an effective issuance
method to mitigate the information asymmetry regarding the quality of the issuing firm.
To the extent that private placement serves the same function of reducing information
asymmetry concerning privately held firms, the information asymmetry hypothesis pre-
dicts the following.
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Hypothesis 1: At the time of their IPOs, PP IPO issuers may face similar or lesser
degree of information asymmetry and hence be less underpriced
than their peers.
Certification Explanation
Hertzel and Smith (1993) postulate that private placements allow management of the is-
suing firm to put intensive effort into communicating with and convincing a concentrated
group of institutional and knowledgeable individual investors of their firm quality. The
information asymmetry literature suggests that some investors have better access to pro-
prietary information than other investors (Wruck and Wu 2009). Hence, the relationship
of the private placement investor to the issuing firm provides a signal or certification of
firm quality: the stronger the relationship, the higher the quality of the firm. Following
Wruck and Wu (2009), we define managers, strategic alliance partners, and existing large
shareholders as informed investors, and other investors as uninformed investors. The cer-
tification explanation postulates that the willingness of informed investors, who have
proprietary information about the firm, to participate in the pre-IPO private placements
conveys a signal or certification of the quality of the issuing firm. Thus, we propose the
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: At the time of IPOs, PP IPO issuers that have informed private
placement investors are associated with less underpricing.
Monitoring Explanation
The agency literature shows that private placements could be motivated by the intention
to increase monitoring of management via increased ownership concentration. Shleifer
and Vishny (1986) show that concentrated ownership, which is attained when a large
percentage of shares is sold to a small number of investors such as the case in a private
placement, improves monitoring incentives of shareholders. Hence, private placements
could improve monitoring of the management of the issuing firm (Wruck 1989), espe-
cially if the ownership is concentrated among active monitoring investors (Wu 2004).
Following Wu (2004), we assume that pension fund and venture capital (VC) fund in-
vestors are likely to play an active monitoring role among private placement investors
and define them as the monitoring investors. If these investors are actively involved in
the monitoring processes, we propose the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: At the time of IPOs, PP IPO issuers that have active monitoring
private placement investors are associated with less underpricing.
III. Sample Selection and Description
We start our sample construction with all IPOs from 1981 to 2002 reported in Thom-
son Financial Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) New Issues Database. To allow for a
homogenous sample, we exclude closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts, banks,
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nondepository financial institutions, and American Depositary Receipts. We also elimi-
nate unit offers as well as offers with issue price less than $5. Then, we identify pre-IPO
private placement activities by checking the private placement file of the SDC New Issues
Database. We match the private placement and IPO databases by the first six digits of
each company’s CUSIP. We define an IPO as a PP IPO if there is at least one successful
private placement of equity identified for the issuing firm before its IPO.
For each IPO, the underpricing is defined as the percentage change between the
offer price and the first-day closing price. The first-day closing price is obtained from the
Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) data file. We obtain financial statement
data from Compustat data file. For each issuing firm, we identify the lead underwriter
from SDC and assign an underwriter rank using Loughran and Ritter’s (2004) ranking.1
Our final PP IPO sample includes 500 firms for 1981 to 2002. In Panel A of
Table 1, we report the number, average issue size, and total issue volume of PP IPOs
for the entire sample period. Consistent with Loughran and Ritter (2004), the average
issue size increased from $50.03 million in the 1980s to $92.79 million in the 1990s, and
then $203.71 million during the Internet bubble period, 1999–2000, before decreasing to
$99.04 million in 2001 and 2002.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the issue and firm characteristics of the PP IPOs
sample and the comparison sample, which includes 6010 IPOs of issuing firms that have
no prior private placements. When compared to the comparison sample, PP IPOs are
larger in issue size and are offered by older firms. In addition, a larger percentage of
their IPOs are underwritten by reputable underwriters. The proportion of high-tech firms,
which are defined as in Loughran and Ritter (2004),2 in the PP IPOs sample is similar to
that in the comparison sample.
IV. Empirical Results
Univariate Analysis of First-Day Returns (Underpricing)
To address potential biases that may result from the differences in firm and issue char-
acteristics of PP IPOs and the comparison sample as reported in Panel B of Table 1, we
construct a matched sample of IPOs (matched sample) in which we match each PP IPO in
our sample to an IPO from the comparison sample, which is of similar issue size, offered
around the same time, and from the same industry.
Specifically, to form the matched sample, for each PP IPO we pick an IPO in
the comparison sample whose offer date is within two months of the PP IPO’s offer date.
From this group, we pick the IPO that is in the same industry as the PP IPO. Next, we
1Loughran and Ritter’s (2004) underwriter prestige rankings are on a scale of 0 to 9 and are based on the
pecking order that is present in “tombstone” advertisements.
2As defined in Loughran and Ritter (2004), high-tech industry are those have SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575,
3577, 3578 (computer hardware); 3661, 3663, 3669 (communications equipment); 3674 (electronics); 3812 (nav-
igation equipment); 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and controlling devices); 3841, 3845 (medical
instruments); 4812, 4813 (telephone equipment); 4899 (communications services); and 7370, 7371, 7372, 7373,
7374, 7375, 7378, 7379 (software).
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TABLE 1. PP IPO Sample.
Panel A. Distribution of PP IPOs over Time
Year Number Proportion % Average Issue Size $M Total Volume $M
1981 2 0.4 12.30 24.60
1982 3 0.6 38.37 115.10
1983 30 6.0 39.33 1,179.90
1984 14 2.8 22.76 318.60
1985 23 4.6 31.37 721.40
1986 32 6.4 27.51 880.40
1987 27 5.4 122.83 3,316.50
1988 19 3.8 54.73 1,039.90
1989 12 2.4 42.41 508.90
1990 13 2.6 34.79 452.30
1991 41 8.2 72.40 2,968.20
1992 36 7.2 67.08 2,415.00
1993 41 8.2 61.93 2,539.20
1994 29 5.8 78.37 2,272.60
1995 36 7.2 63.98 2,303.30
1996 33 6.6 104.31 3,442.20
1997 18 3.6 168.67 3,036.10
1998 20 4.0 267.35 5,346.90
1999 32 6.4 281.58 9,010.60
2000 29 5.8 117.78 3,415.70
2001 5 1.0 78.34 391.70
2002 5 1.0 124.93 499.70
1981–1989 162 32.4 50.03 8,105.30
1990–1998 267 53.4 92.79 24,775.80
1999–2000 61 12.2 203.71 12,426.30
2001–2002 10 2.0 99.04 891.40
Total 500 100.0 92.58 46,198.80
Panel B. Offer and Firm Characteristics of PP IPO Sample versus Comparison Sample
Comparison Sample of
PP IPOs Sample All Other IPOs Difference in
Means
Variables N Mean Median N Mean Median t-statistics
Offer size 500 92.58 40.40 6,010 49.23 21.00 3.17∗∗∗
Total asset before offer 320 240.79 48.75 3,837 160.53 17.90 1.23
Market value 387 259.88 106.54 4,940 260.53 48.45 −0.01
Revenue 335 213.10 45.00 4,015 116.11 21.80 2.86∗∗∗
Age 483 15.70 7.00 5,388 12.93 7.00 2.78∗∗∗
Rank 500 7.92 8.75 6,010 6.51 7.88 16.14∗∗∗
Tech proportion 500 0.35 0.00 6,010 0.33 0.00 0.86
Note: PP IPOs are initial public offerings by 500 U.S. firms, each of which had at least one private placement of
equity before its IPO. Panel A presents the number of PP IPOs, average issue size, and total issue volume by year.
Panel B compares the offer and firm characteristics of PP IPO sample and comparison sample. Offer size is the
total gross proceeds ($ million) from the issue. Total asset ($ million) is the value of firm’s total asset at the fiscal
year-end preceding its IPO. Market value ($ million) is the market value of the firm before its IPO. It is calculated
by using the number of shares before the IPO times the midpoint of the filing price range. Revenue ($ million) is
the net sales for the fiscal year preceding its IPO. Age is the number of years between the firm’s equity IPO and
its incorporation. Rank is the underwriter rank based on Loughran and Ritter (2004). Tech dummy equals one if
the firm belongs to the high-tech industry, and zero otherwise. The t-statistic tests whether the mean values of the
variables or of the percentages of the sample where relevant are significantly different between PP IPO sample and
the comparison sample.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1% level.
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TABLE 2. Univariate Comparison of Underpricing between PP IPOs and Comparison IPOs.
Panel A. Comparison by Period
PP IPOs Sample Matched Sample Difference in Means
Proportion % First-Day Return % First-Day Return % t-statistics
1981–1989 32 6.02 9.64 −2.30∗∗
1990–1998 55 9.74 14.84 −3.01∗∗∗
1999–2000 13 53.07 83.05 −1.98∗∗
Total 100 14.30 22.24 −3.02∗∗∗
Panel B. Comparison by Underwriter Prestige
High prestige 76 14.47 23.49 −2.89∗∗∗
Low prestige 24 13.78 18.20 −0.95
Total 100 14.30 22.24 −3.02∗∗∗
Panel C. Comparison by Time Lag between Private Placement and IPO
Below median 50 16.31 25.47 −2.28∗∗
Above median 50 11.22 19.09 −2.74∗∗∗
Total 100 14.30 22.24 −3.02∗∗∗
Note: In all panels of Table 2, underpricing is the percentage change from the offer price to the closing price on
the first day of trade. In Panel B, for both samples, we obtain underwriter information from the Securities Data
Corporation New Issues Database. High-prestige underwriters are those with Loughran and Ritter (2004) ranking
of 8 or higher on a 9-point scale. In Panel C, “Below median” is defined as private placement initial public offerings
(PP IPOs) that have a prior private placement within 542 days median of the period between private placement and
IPO. The t-statistics under the column titled “Difference in Means” is the t-statistic associated with a difference
in means test. In this means test, the null hypothesis is that the first-day returns are equal across the PP IPOs and
matched samples.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1% level.
∗∗Significant at the the 5% level.
choose the IPO whose issue size is within 50% to 150% of that of the PP IPO. The
formation of the matched sample assumes, ceteris paribus, that regular IPOs are more
likely to have the same underpricing behavior if they are similar in issue size, in the
same industry and are offered under comparable market conditions to PP IPOs. We find
matched firms for 452 (out of 500) PP IPOs.3
By Period. In Table 2, we report the means of the first-day returns (underpricing)
for the PP IPOs sample and the matched sample. Panel A reports comparisons for
the entire sample period and for three subsample periods: 1981–1989, 1990–1998, and
1999–2000.4 For the entire sample period, the underpricing of PP IPOs averaged 14.30%,
compared to 22.24% for matched IPOs. This difference is statistically significant. For both
samples, underpricing increased substantially in 1999–2000. For the matched sample, the
average first-day return was 9.64% in the 1980s. In the 1990s, the average first-day return
3Our matching criteria are motivated by the differences across the two groups that are documented in Panel B
of Table 1. We do not find appropriate matches for some PP IPOs, and hence our total sample size is reduced from
500 to 452 issues. There is no match firm for 10 PP IPOs that were issued in 2001 and 2002.
4Several studies (e.g., Loughran and Ritter 2004) document unusual pattern in IPO underpricing during the
Internet bubble period. Therefore, we redo our empirical tests excluding IPOs during the period of 1999–2002. The
main results are qualitatively identical to those reported in this article.
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increased to 14.84%, then jumped to more than 83.05% during the Internet bubble period.
A similar pattern is observed for the PP IPOs sample. In the 1980s, the average first-day
return was 6.02%. In the 1990s, the average first-day return rose to 9.74% and then
increased to 53.07% during the Internet bubble period. In all subsample periods, the
initial returns for PP IPOs are significantly (at the 5% level) lower than the respective
levels for the matched sample.
By Underwriter Reputation. In Panel B of Table 2, we categorize IPOs on the
basis of the reputation of their lead underwriters. We define high-prestige underwriters
(HPUs) as those with a Ritter and Loughran (2004) ranking of 8 or higher on a 9-
point scale. We note that more than three-fourths of the PP IPOs are led by HPUs. The
results show that PP IPOs underwritten by HPUs experienced average initial returns of
14.47% compared to 13.78% for those managed by less prestigious underwriters (LPUs).
The returns are 23.49% and 18.20% for the matched sample, respectively. We find that
the underpricing of the PP IPOs sample is significantly less than that of the matched
sample for issues underwritten by HPUs. For issues that were underwritten by LPUs, the
underpricing of PP IPOs is not significantly less than that of the matched sample.
By Time Lag between Private Placement and IPO. In Panel C of Table 2, we
examine whether the time lag between the private placement and the IPO affects IPO
underpricing. For our PP IPOs sample, the mean and median time lags are 2.5 and 1.5 years
respectively. We divide the PP IPOs into two groups by the median time lag (542 days) in
Panel C. The results show that both groups of PP IPOs have significantly less underpricing
than the matched firms. We also note that PP IPOs that go public sooner following their
private placements experienced marginally significantly more underpricing than those
that have longer time lags between their private placements and IPOs. However, this
finding is probably driven by more PP IPO issuers in the below-median group taking
advantage of the hot issue market to go public during the Internet bubble period, which
is characterized as a period of unusually large underpricing.
In summary, the results reported in Table 2 suggest that PP IPOs experienced
significantly less underpricing than their peers, especially those that are underwritten
by reputable underwriters. These results hold across different subsample periods and
regardless of the time lag between their pre-IPO private placements and their IPOs.
To supplement the analysis of underpricing in measuring the impact of pre-IPO
private placements on issuance costs, we compare the gross spread of PP IPOs with that
of the matched IPOs.5 We find that the average gross spread of PP IPOs was less than
that of matched IPOs in each subsample period. For the entire sample period, the gross
spread of PP IPOs is 7.02%, which is significantly lower than that of the matched sample
(7.13%). Hence, we conclude that PP IPOs are associated with lower issuance costs than
their peers.
Regression Analysis of Underpricing
Next, we examine the underpricing of PP IPOs and all other IPOs by using the ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression analysis to control for known factors that may explain
5Though the results are not reported in this article, they are available from the authors upon request.
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their underpricing. The dependent variable is underpricing. The independent variables
control for demand for issue, firm and issue sizes, industry, market conditions, and firm
quality.
PP Dummy and Control Variables. The PP dummy is a binary variable that
equals one if the issuer had pre-IPO private placements, and zero otherwise. This dummy
variable captures the difference in underpricing between issuing firms that had prior
private placements and those that did not in a multivariate regression setting.
MKTV is defined as the logarithm of the value (in $million) of the issuing firm
before its IPO, where the value is calculated by multiplying the number of shares before
the IPO with the midpoint of the filing price range.
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) find that IPOs that are certified by managerial
quality of the issuer are associated with larger issue sizes. They argue that the larger issue
size reflects a larger scale of value creating investment projects. We define Offer_Size
as the natural logarithm of the IPO issue size (in $million). The market probably knows
more about older firms through their products even though their securities may not have
a public presence. We measure firm age (Age) by the number of years between their year
of incorporation and the year of their IPO.
We use three variables to control for market conditions at the time of the IPO:
(1) MKTret, which we define as the average return on the CRSP value-weighted index
over the period between the filing date and the offer date; (2) SD_MKT , which we define
as standard deviation of the market return between the filing date and the offer date; and
(3) IPOVol, which we define as the number of IPOs offered during the six weeks before
the IPO offer date.
Beatty and Welch (1996) document a nonstationary relation between reputation
and underpricing. To control for the role of underwriter’s reputation in certifying the
quality of the issuing firm, we include the underwriter rank of Loughran and Ritter
(2004) as the Rank variable. The literature documents unusual IPO underpricing pattern
during the Internet bubble period. Hence, we include the Tech and Internet dummy
variables to control for their impacts on underpricing. The Tech dummy equals one if the
issuing firm belongs to the high-tech industry as defined earlier, and zero otherwise. The
Internet dummy equals one if the issue occurred during 1999–2000, and zero otherwise.
As new information about the demand for the IPO becomes available through
the road show for an IPO, underwriters tend to revise the offer price. We include the
Scaled_Offer variable, which is defined by scaling the IPO offer price by the average of
the original high and low filing prices, PHigh and PLow, to control for this effect. We also
include the Upward variable in the regressions. Upward equals one if the offer price is
set above the initial filing price range, and zero otherwise.
Regression Results. Consistent with the overall results of the univariate analysis,
Model 1 of Table 3 reports a significant negative coefficient for the PP dummy. This
suggests that issuers that have pre-IPO private placements experience less underpricing
than those without, and the observed less underpricing of PP IPO firms cannot be
explained by the control variables that are used in the regression.
Consistent with Ljungavist (2007), the significant negative coefficients for offer
size and firm age variables reflect that issuing firms that are perceived to be of better
quality are subject to less underpricing. Technology firms tend to have more underpricing.
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TABLE 3. Regressions.
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
Panel A. OLS Regressions on IPO Underpricing
Constant 11.953 2.98∗∗∗ 11.429 3.07∗∗∗
PP dummy −4.128 −2.03∗∗ −5.056 −2.72∗∗∗
MKTret 2.758 0.60 7.633 1.81∗
SD_MKT 0.002 0.45 0.002 0.56
IPOVol −1.151 −1.38 −1.107 −1.45
MKTV 5.277 6.85∗∗∗ 4.923 7.00∗∗∗
Offer_Size −6.567 −6.36∗∗∗ −4.686 −4.96∗∗∗
Age −0.095 −2.91∗∗∗ −0.101 −3.41∗∗∗
Tech 4.689 3.74∗∗∗ 3.646 2.91∗∗∗
Internet_Tech 8.721 2.90∗∗∗
Internet 39.657 22.16∗∗∗ −29.572 −3.64∗∗∗
Scaled_Offer 7.322 20.17∗∗∗ 3.447 9.17∗∗∗
Internet_Scaled 12.385 15.86∗∗∗
Upward Revision 16.885 9.04∗∗∗ 12.729 6.78∗∗∗
Interent_Upward 13.761 3.07∗∗∗
Rank 0.483 1.31 −0.183 −0.53
Internet_Rank 6.252 6.35∗∗∗
Adj. R2 0.40 0.50
No. of obs. 3,947 3,947
Panel B. OLS Regressions on Underpricing for Non-VC-Backed IPOs
Constant 6.352 2.29∗∗ 7.990 2.90∗∗∗
PP dummy −3.387 −2.06∗∗ −3.208 −1.97∗∗
MKTret 12.863 4.44∗∗∗ 13.717 4.79∗∗∗
SD_MKT 0.002 1.21 0.002 1.27
IPOVol 1.198 1.82∗ 1.177 1.81∗
MKTV 0.385 0.82 0.423 0.91
Offer_Size −0.367 −0.60 −0.354 −0.58
Age −0.056 −3.11∗∗∗ −0.056 −3.18∗∗∗
Tech 4.960 5.45∗∗∗ 3.650 3.81∗∗∗
Internet_Tech 10.277 3.80∗∗∗
Internet 11.385 8.16∗∗∗ −18.672 −3.50∗∗∗
Scaled_Offer 3.040 12.02∗∗∗ 2.814 10.52∗∗∗
Internet_Scaled 1.427 1.96∗∗
Upward Revision 12.170 9.63∗∗∗ 11.738 8.82∗∗∗
Interent_Upward 1.154 0.29
Rank −0.282 −1.28 −0.513 −2.31∗∗
Internet_Rank 3.317 4.98∗∗∗
Adj. R2 0.29 0.31
No. of obs. 2,131 2,131
Note: The dependent variable is the initial return. The PP dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the issue is a private placement
initial publication offering (PP IPO), and zero otherwise. MKTret is the market return on the CRSP value-weighted index between the offer
and the filing date of the IPO. SD_MKT is the standard deviation of the market return over the time between the filing and the offer date.
IPOVol is the number of IPOs during the six weeks before the IPO offer date. MKTV is the logarithm of the market value of the firm in
millions of dollars before its IPO. It is calculated by using the number of shares before the filing times the midpoint of the filing price range.
Offer_Size is the natural logarithm of the IPO issue size. Age is the difference in the number of years between their year of incorporation and
the year of their IPO. Tech is the high-tech industry dummy that equals one if the firm belongs to the high-tech industry, and zero otherwise.
Internet is the Internet bubble dummy that equals one if the issue occurred during 1999–2000, and zero otherwise. Scaled_Offer is defined
by scaling the IPO offer price by the average of the original high and low filing prices, PHigh and PLow. Upward equals one if Revision is
greater than one, and zero otherwise. Rank is the underwriter rank based on Loughran and Ritter (2004). Internet_XXX is the interaction of
Internet dummies and the variable XXX . For example, Internet_Rank is the interaction of rank and Internet dummies. OLS = ordinary least
squares; VC = venture capital.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1% level.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level.
∗Significant at the 10% level.
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The Internet dummy is positive and significant, reflecting greater underpricing during
the Internet bubble years of 1999–2000. In addition, the positive and highly statistically
significant coefficients for the Scaled_Offer and Upward variables that reflect strong
demand for the issues are associated with greater underpricing.
On the other hand, the positive though statistically insignificant coefficient for
the Rank dummy variable suggests that more underpricing is associated with quality
issuers that are underwritten by reputable underwriters. This result is inconsistent with
the implications of the certifying roles of reputable underwriters. However, Loughran and
Ritter (2004) argue that changing underwriting practices might explain the increasing IPO
underpricing over time, especially during the Internet bubble period.
Further Regression Results. In our further analysis of the role of pre-IPO private
placements in lesser underpricing, we control for the impacts of changing underwriting
practices on IPO underpricing during the Internet bubble period by introducing
interactive variables on selected control variables. Loughran and Ritter (2004) suggest
that the relaxation of standards by reputable underwriters resulted in their taking public
an increasing number of young unprofitable companies. This may explain the unusual
IPO pricing patterns observed for the Internet bubble period. Hence, we introduce the
interactive dummy variable, Internet_Rank, to capture IPOs that were underwritten by
reputable underwriters during the Internet bubble period. In Model 2, the positive and
significant (at the 1% level) coefficient for the Internet_Rank dummy is consistent with
the explanations provided by Loughran and Ritter for changing underpricing patterns
during the Internet bubble period.6
In addition, we add interactive variables to the Tech dummy, Scaled_Offer and
Upward variables, that is, Internet_Tech, Internet_Scaled, and Internet_Upward, respec-
tively, to capture their potential differential impacts on IPO underpricing during the Inter-
net bubble period. The positive and significant coefficients for these interactive variables
are consistent with the unusual underpricing patterns documented for the Internet bubble
period in the literature.7
More important, the coefficient for the PP dummy variable continues to be
negative and significant (at the 1% level) in Model 2 further supports the role of pre-IPO
private placements in reducing underpricing of the issuing firms at the time of their IPOs.
The negative and significant coefficients of the PP dummy in both models
suggest that even after we control for relevant factors that are known to affect IPO
underpricing in a multivariate framework, the results from the univariate analyses remain
6Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2005) show that issuing firms and underwriters make mutual decisions in
pairing themselves up, and that underwriter reputation and issuer quality are complementary, in the IPO process.
In other words, prestigious investment bankers choose to underwrite better quality firms, and better quality firms
tend to choose more reputable underwriters, supporting the notion that underwriter serves as a certifying agent for
the issuer’s quality. By hiring reputable underwriters, better quality issuers convey a positive signal to investors and
experience less underpricing (Safieddine, McLaughlin, and Vasudevan 2000). With the existence of endogeneity
between firm quality and underwriter choice, the OLS coefficients of explanatory variables may be inconsistent.
7It is interesting to note the significant negative coefficient for the Internet dummy variable in model 2, which
suggests that unpopular IPOs of nontech firms experienced significantly less underpricing during the Internet
bubble period.
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robust. Private placement activities of issuing firms prior to their IPOs are associated
with lesser underpricing of their IPOs.
Robustness Test
The literature documents conflicting impacts of VC backing on the underpricing of IPOs.
Earlier studies such as Megginson and Weiss (1991) show that VC backing reduces IPO
underpricing. On the other hand, Lee and Wahal (2004) and Loughran and Ritter (2004)
show that IPOs backed by VC are associated with greater underpricing, especially during
the Internet bubble period. Furthermore, Ritter (2009) documents that VC-backed IPOs
continue to experience larger underpricing than IPOs that are not VC backed in the
post-Internet bubble era.
To the extent that our sample and matched IPOs are backed by VC, our results
may be distorted by the documented impacts of VC backing on IPO underpricing. Hence,
we check the robustness of our findings of significantly less underpricing of PP IPOs by
filtering out VC-backed IPOs, which are identified using the SDC database, from our
analysis.
We report the results on the smaller, uncontaminated sample of 195 PP IPOs
that are not backed by VC. The univariate results show that the average underpricing
of these 195 non-VC-backed IPOs is 13.65%, compared to 23.41% for their matched
sample of non-VC-backed IPOs. The difference is statistically significant at the 5%
level (t = –2.27). In addition, Panel B of Table 3 reports the regression analysis on
the underpricing of the non-VC-backed PP IPOs and all other non-VC-backed IPOs
after controlling for known factors that may explain their underpricing. Using the
same model specifications as in Panel A of Table 3, we find negative and statistically
significant coefficients for the PP dummy in both regressions. These findings suggest
that our results regarding the mitigating effect of pre-IPO private placements on IPO
underpricing are not driven by VC-backed IPOs.
V. Potential Explanations for Less Underpricing of PP IPOs
The findings on first-day returns suggest that PP IPOs are not subject to higher under-
pricing than their peers. Furthermore, after we control for known factors that determine
IPO underpricing, PP IPOs face significantly less underpricing. In this section, we try to
explain why PP IPOs experience less under pricing.
Information Asymmetry Explanation
In Table 4, we use professional analysts’ coverage as a proxy for information asymmetry
concerning the quality of the issuing firm. We present data on analyst coverage for
PP IPOs and the matched sample from the Institutional Broker Estimates System (IBES)
database. Previous studies use analyst coverage to measure the level of information
available to the market and investors. For instance, Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary (2006)
argue for a negative correlation between the level of analyst coverage and the degree of
information asymmetry faced by issuing firms. Such an inverse relation may result from
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TABLE 4. Analysts’ Coverage.
PP IPOs Matched Sample t-statistics
Number of analysts –2 months of IPO 2.56 2.25 1.83∗
Number of analysts –6 months of IPO 3.09 2.94 1.05
IPOs with coverage in < 2 months % 40.71 39.38 0.58
IPOs with coverage in < 6 months % 76.33 71.90 2.09∗∗
Note: This table reports data on analysts’ coverage for private placement initial public offerings (PP IPOs) and
matched sample from Institutional Broker Estimates System (IBES) database. The t-statistic is the difference of
means t-test.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level.
∗Significant at the 10% level.
analysts’ ability to directly reduce information asymmetry, or analysts being attracted to
firms that face a lesser degree of information asymmetry, which lowers the information
acquisition costs. Because there is no analyst coverage of the issuing firm preceding its
IPO, we assume that postissue analyst coverage is positively correlated with information
availability at the time of the IPO. A different strand of the literature, however, suggests
that IPO firms may purchase analyst coverage with underpricing (Cliff and Dennis 2004).
Rajan and Servaes (1997) and Loughran and Ritter (2004) find that IPO underpricing is
positively related to analyst coverage, especially during the Internet bubble period.
The results in Table 4 show that even with less underpricing than the matched
sample, PP IPO firms enjoy significantly (at the 10% level) more analyst coverage
two months (about the expiration date of the quiet period) after their IPOs. In addition,
the percentage of the PP IPOs sample that has analyst coverage six months from their IPOs
is significantly (at the 5% level) higher than that of the matched sample. These results
are consistent with the notion that issuing firms that had pre-IPO private placements may
face a lesser degree of information asymmetry concerning their quality than their peers
at the time of their IPOs.8 Therefore, even with lower underpricing, these firms attract
more analyst coverage.
In the theoretical models that are discussed in Section I, underpricing is consid-
ered as a measure of information asymmetry. Firms for which information is more readily
available and transparent are expected to be associated with less underpricing at the time
of their IPOs. Older firms are more likely to be associated with greater information
availability because they are likely to be more established and better known to investors,
and hence subject to less information asymmetry. Although the results in Table 5 show
that there is no significant difference between the age of the PP IPOs and the matched
sample at the time of their IPOs, Panel B of Table 1 shows that PP IPO issuers are older
than other IPO issuers who had no pre-IPO private placement activities.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires firms to file financial
information starting the year of their public debt or equity offering. Privately held firms
must file with the SEC if they have 500 or more employees. PP IPO issuers could be
8Our results are consistent with McNichols and O’Brien’s (1997) postulation that the optimistic bias in
analysts’ coverage is a result of their selective allocation of scarce resources to cover quality firms.
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TABLE 5. Age and Proportion of Firms that Have Information on Compustat Database One Year before
the Time of the Equity IPO.
t-statistics
PP IPOs Sample Matched Sample of Difference
Age
Mean 15.70 15.39 0.05
Median 7 7
PP IPOs Sample Matched Sample Comparison across
Groups
% of Firms that Have Information on
Compustat One Year Before the
Firm’s Equity IPO Proportion % Proportion % t-statistics
Information on total assets 33.85 30.31 1.64
Information on sales 33.63 30.09 1.64
Note: Age is the difference in the number of years between their year of incorporation and the year of their initial
public offering (IPO). The t-statistic is a difference of means t-test that tests differences across the two groups.
better known to the investment community by virtue of their pre-IPO private placements.
Therefore, we examine the history of publicly available information on the issuing firms at
the time of their IPOs by searching the Compustat database for firms that have information
one year before their IPOs. We find that almost 34% of PP IPOs, compared to 30% for the
matched sample, have information on Compustat one year before their IPOs. However,
the difference is marginally significant at the 11% level.
Overall, these findings, albeit weak, are consistent with the postulation of the
information asymmetry explanation that successful pre-IPO private placements help
mitigate information asymmetry concerning the quality of issuing firms that lead to less
underpricing at their IPOs.
Certification Explanation
Since May 1996, firms are required to file prospectuses for their private placements
electronically with the SEC. In our sample, there are 135 PP IPOs offered after May
1996. For these 135 PP IPOs, we search the SEC’s EDGAR database for complete
prospectuses (S-1) with keywords such as private stock offering, private placement,
privately negotiated transaction, and direct placement (sale). We then identify names and
characteristics of the investor(s), and their relationships with the issuing firm from the
“Management” and “Principal and Selling Shareholders” sections of the IPO prospectus.
In addition, we supplement our search with the news file of the LexisNexis database and
the issuing company’s website. Overall, we find private placement investor information
for 130 of these 135 companies.
We follow Wu (2004) to categorize private placement investors into seven nonex-
clusive groups: (1) managers (officers and directors), (2) strategic alliance partners (sup-
pliers, customers, and strategic alliance partners), (3) existing large shareholders (existing
shareholders with at least 5% ownership), (4) VC firms, (5) financial institutions (pen-
sion funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, banks, foundations, units and investment
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TABLE 6. Private Placement Investors.
Number of Placements Frequency %
Managers 22 16.30%
Strategic alliance partners 29 21.48%
Existing large shareholders 19 14.07%
Venture capital firms 39 28.89%
Financial institutions 67 49.63%
Corporate investors 13 9.63%
Individual investors 13 9.63%
Characteristics of investors unidentified 5 3.70%
Multiple investors 41 30.37%
Single investor 89 65.93%
Number of investors unidentified 5 3.70%
Note: This table presents the number and frequency of pre-IPO private placements that were placed with the
respective categories of investors as defined in Wu (2004).
TABLE 7. Univariate Comparison of Underpricing by Pre-IPO Private Placement Investors’ Types.
PP IPOs Sample Matched Sample Difference in Means
Proportion % First-Day Return % First-Day Return % t-statistics
Panel A. Whether Private Placement Investors Are Informed
Uninformed 58 34.44 55.98 −1.84∗
Informed 42 24.71 51.52 −2.51∗∗
Total 100 31.04 55.30 −2.91∗∗∗
Panel B. Whether Private Placement Investors are Monitoring
Passive group 61 32.81 49.51 −1.58
Active monitoring group 39 28.31 63.10 −2.56∗∗
Total 100 31.04 55.30 −2.91∗∗∗
Note: Underpricing is the percentage change from the offer price to the closing price on the first day of trade. The
t-statistics under the column titled “Difference in Means” is the t-statistic associated with a difference in means
test. In this means test, the null hypothesis is that the first-day returns are equal across the private placement initial
public offerings (PP IPOs) and matched samples. In Panel A, “Informed” is defined as the first three groups:
(1) managers, (2) strategic alliance partners, and (3) existing large shareholders. In Panel B, “Active monitoring
group” is defined as the private placement investors who are pension funds and venture capitalists who actively
monitor the issuers.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1% level.
∗∗Significant at the 5% level.
∗Significant at the 10% level.
trusts, and endowments), (6) corporate investors with no business ties to the issuing firm,
and (7) Individual investors with no employment or business ties to the issuing firm.
Table 6 reports that approximately half of the pre-IPO private placements of
equity of these 130 PP IPO issuers are placed with financial institutions, followed by
venture capitalists (29%) and strategic alliance partners (21.5%). Besides, about 30% of
private placements are placed with multiple investors.
In Panel A of Table 7, we categorize private placement investors on the basis
of information they have. Following Wruck and Wu (2009), we define the first three
groups of private placement investors, namely, managers, strategic alliance partners, and
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existing large shareholders, to be informed investors (Informed), and other investors as
uninformed investors (Uninformed). The willingness of sophisticated investors, who have
proprietary information about the firm, to participate in the pre-IPO private placements
conveys a signal or certification of the quality of the issuing firm. The results show that the
underpricing of PP IPOs is significantly less than that of the matched sample, regardless
of the types of private placement investors. Although PP IPOs with informed private
placement investors experienced less underpricing than PP IPOs with uninformed private
placement investors (24.71% vs. 34.44%), the difference is not statistically significant.
Besides, the magnitude of the difference in underpricing of PP IPOs with informed
investors and that of their matched IPO peers (26.81%) is comparable to the magnitude
of underpricing for the PP IPOs with uninformed investors sample (21.54%). Hence, the
support for the certification explanation (Hypothesis 2) is limited.
Monitoring Explanation
In Panel B of Table 7, we categorize private placement investors on the basis of whether
they actively monitor the firm. We follow Wu (2004) and define pension funds and
venture capitalists as private placement investors who actively monitor the issuers. Pension
fund managers actively monitor their portfolio companies through participation in proxy
proposals, private negotiation, or both (Karpoff 2001), and venture capitalists work
closely with management and hence monitor them intensively (Admati and Pfleiderer
1994). Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the results show that the IPO underpricing of
the active monitoring investors group is significantly less than that of their matched
firms, while the difference between IPO underpricing of the passive investors group and
that of their matched firms is not statistically significant. In addition, the group of 51
PP IPOs with active private placement investors experienced less underpricing (28.31%)
than the 79 PP IPOs with passive private placement investors (32.81%). Though not
statistically significant, the magnitude of the difference in the underpricing of PP IPOs
with active investors and that of their matched IPO peers (34.79%) is more than double
of the magnitude of the difference in underpricing for the PP IPOs with passive investors
sample (16.70%). Overall, our findings suggest a possible though limited role of the
monitoring activities of private placement investors in improving the quality of PP IPO
issuers that leads to their lesser IPO underpricing.
VI. Long-Term Stock Price Performance of PP IPO Issuers
In this section, we explore the long-term risk-adjusted stock return performance of IPOs
with prior private placements in relation to that of their peers. Following Fama (1993)
and Mitchell and Stafford (2000), we use a monthly calendar-time portfolio approach to
gauge the long-term abnormal performance of our PP IPOs and matched IPOs during the
sample period. For each calendar month we form value-weighted portfolios for each of
the PP IPOs and matched IPOs samples. The weights are based on the end of previous-
month market capitalization of sample firms. The excess returns of the portfolios are
used to estimate the Fama–French three-factor model as follows:
Rpt − Rft = α + β(Rmt − Rft) + γ SMBt + δHMLt + εt ,
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TABLE 8. Long-Term Stock Price Performance of PP IPOs Relative to Matched IPO Sample.
PP IPO Sample
Intercept α β γ δ Adjusted R2
−0.03388 1.06798 0.53883 −0.70972 0.7023
−0.13 (16.96) (6.73) (−7.39)
Matched IPO sample
−0.00181 1.25416 0.93529 −0.99041 0.8622
−0.02 (13.09) (7.69) (−6.77)
Difference in intercept −0.03569
PP IPO–Other IPOs (−1.28)
Note: This table presents the Fama and French (1993) three-factor time-series regression results for three years
following the initial public offering (IPO). For each calendar month we form a value-weighted portfolio for each of
the private placement (PP) IPOs and matched IPOs sample. The weights are based on the end of previous-month
market capitalization of sample firms. The excess returns of the portfolio are used to estimate the Fama–French
three-factor model as follows:
Rpt − Rft = α + β Rmt − Rft + γ SMBt + δHMLt + εt ,
where Rpt is the calendar-time portfolio return for each sample in month t and Rft is the risk-free return in the
same month. The three Fama–French factors are the excess return on the market portfolio Rmt − Rft, the difference
in the returns of value-weighted portfolios of small stocks and large stocks, SMBt, and the difference in returns
of value-weighted portfolios of high book-to-market and low book-to-market stocks, HMLt. The t-statistics for
intercept is given below in parentheses.
where Rpt is the calendar-time portfolio return for each sample in month t and Rft is
the risk-free return in the same month. The three Fama–French factors are the excess
return on the market portfolio (Rmt − Rft), the difference in the returns of value-weighted
portfolios of small stocks and large stocks (SMBt), and the difference in the returns of
value-weighted portfolios of high book-to-market and low book-to-market stocks (HMLt).
The coefficient estimate of the intercept term, α, from the time-series regressions are
used as an indicator of risk-adjusted stock return for each sample portfolio.
Table 8 presents the time-series regression results of the Fama and French (1993)
three-factor model for a three-year horizon following the month of the IPO. We observe
that the intercept terms for both samples of IPOs are not reliably different from zero.
This is consistent with the findings of Ritter and Welch (2002) that IPOs issued between
1973 and 2001 had insignificant intercepts in Fama and French three-factor regressions.
Similarly for our IPO samples, the coefficients of the market factor (Rmt − Rft) and the
size factor (SMBt) show compatible magnitude and sign to those reported in Ritter and
Welch (2002) and Brav and Gompers (1997). However, the magnitude of the book-to-
market ratio loading is larger than, even though it has the same sign as, that documented in
earlier studies. Furthermore, the loadings of the market factor suggest that our PP IPO and
matched IPO firms have higher than average levels of systematic risk. In addition, their
returns covary with the returns of low book-to-market ratio (growth) firms. In summary,
our sample IPO firms have similar characteristics as those reported in prior studies.
Although we observe some differences in the factor loadings between our two samples
of IPO firms, the intercept term for the PP IPOs sample (−3.39%) is not significantly
different from that of the matched IPOs sample (−0.18%). This implies that PP IPO
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firms do not display long-term risk-adjusted stock price underperformance relative to
their peers.
VII. Conclusion
Could prior private placements of privately held firms help reduce the issuance costs (both
underpricing and underwriting spread) of their IPOs? We find that PP IPO firms, that is,
firms that have successful private placements of equity before their IPOs, experience less
underpricing and less underwriting spread at the time of their IPOs than their peers. Our
findings are consistent with the notion that PP IPO firms are able to convey their quality
credibly to the market with their successful pre-IPO private placements, thus reducing
the level of information asymmetry at the time of their IPOs. There is weak evidence
that less underpricing of PP IPO issuers relative to their peers is more evident among
those who are placed with informed investors and active monitoring investors. Although
issuing firms of PP IPOs are about the same age as the matched firms, they have more
information available before their IPOs and enjoy more analyst coverage than their peers.
A lower degree of information asymmetry may result in lower costs for outsiders
to evaluate the IPO firms. The outsiders can be financial intermediaries evaluating the
firm for their decisions to underwrite or institutional investors evaluating the firm for their
decisions to invest. This can result in more reputable underwriting syndicates and lower
underwriting spreads that are observed for firms that have private placements before their
IPOs. On the whole, our results suggest that quality issuers could benefit by successful
pre-IPO private placements that may help reduce the costs of going public.
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